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Abstract
We test the e®ect of players' moods on their behavior in a gift-exchange game. In the
¯rst stage of the game, player 1 chooses a transfer to player 2. In the second stage, player
2 chooses an e®ort level. Higher e®ort is more costly for player 2, but it increases player
1's payo®. We say that player 2 reciprocates if e®ort is increasing in the transfer received.
Player 2 is generous if an e®ort is incurred even when no transfer is received. Subjects play
this game in two di®erent moods. To induce a `bad mood', subjects in the role of player
2 watched a sad movie before playing the game; to induce a `good mood', they watched a
funny movie.
Mood induction was e®ective: subjects who saw the funny movie reported a signi¯cantly
better mood than those who saw the sad movie. These two moods lead to signi¯cant
di®erences in player 2's behavior. We ¯nd that a bad mood implies more reciprocity while
a good mood implies more generosity. Since high transfers are relatively more common,
player 1 make more money when second movers are in a bad mood.
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1 Introduction
The standard theory of agents' preferences has two fundamental assumptions: preferences
are de¯ned on one's own payo®s, and preferences are stable over time and environments. A
large body of recent experimental evidence, however, calls into question the validity of the
¯rst assumption. For example, in ultimatum games and gift-exchange games, players do not
maximize their monetary earnings.1
Factors like altruistic motives, aversion to inequity, or a preference for being treated kindly
(and an aversion to unkind treatment) have been introduced to explain players' behavior in
these experiments. Altruism and inequity aversion models use preferences that depend on one's
own payo® and others' payo®s. For example, Fehr and Schmidt [19] and Bolton and Ockenfels
[5] assume that some players have utility functions that include as arguments not only their own
payo® but also a measure of the distribution of payo®s for all players in the game; in particular,
players have an aversion to inequity. Reciprocity models use preferences that depend on one's
own payo® and beliefs.2 For example, Rabin [32] and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [13] assume
individuals like to return intentionally kind or unkind actions with actions of the same type.
These theories provide a general structure that encompasses independent (or `sel¯sh') pref-
erences and interdependent (or `moral') preferences. Some economists suggest that we can use
these extended preferences to explain phenomena that previously seemed inexplicable. This is
the argument pursued by Fehr and GÄachter [15] and Fehr and Schmidt [20].
This line of research requires the assumption that moral preferences are stable. That is, they
are invariant across di®erent games, and restrictive enough to provide interesting predictions.
This seems to be a reasonable and important requirement. In fact some scholars argue forcefully
that stability is a necessary condition for a theory of behavior based on preferences to be
interesting.3 If moral preferences are stable, the research program based on sel¯sh stable
1 The recent literature on this topic is very large: see Andreoni [1] , Charness [9], Charness and Haruvy [11],
Charness and Rabin [12], Fehr et al. [17] and [18]; Fehr and GÄachter [16] provide a comprehensive survey.
2 This approach uses psychological games as introduced by Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti in [22].
3 For instance, in the words of Gary Becker:
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preferences has indeed been extended for greater generality and empirical validity.
In this paper, we test whether moral preferences are stable with respect to a simple char-
acteristic of the environment: players' moods. Our test consists of an experiment based on
the gift-exchange game. This game is played by two individuals acting sequentially. The ¯rst
mover has a sum of money and can transfer some of it to the second mover. The second mover
receives the transfer and then chooses an e®ort level. Higher e®ort is more costly to the second
mover, but it increases the ¯rst mover's payo®.4 Using this game, altruistic behavior has been
documented in a variety of di®erent settings: second movers exert e®ort even when it implies
a positive cost and no bene¯t.5
In our experiment, second movers' mood is manipulated. Before starting the gift-exchange
game, we induce either a good mood or a bad mood. We then observe subjects' behavior. In
both moods, and consistent with the existing literature, second movers display reciprocal be-
havior: e®ort is increasing in the transfer received. Players' choices, however, di®er signi¯cantly
across moods. In particular, when the transfer received is low, subjects in a good mood choose
higher e®ort; when the transfer received is high, subjects in a bad mood choose higher e®ort.
Since high transfers are relatively more common, this di®erence in e®ort yields the surprising
conclusion that ¯rst movers who face subjects in a bad mood do better than ¯rst movers who
face subjects in a good mood.6
These ¯ndings have clear implications for two fundamental aspects of moral preferences:
reciprocity and generosity. The former is measured by the slope of the e®ort-transfer relation-
\The assumption of stable preferences provides a stable foundation for generating predictions
about responses to various changes, and prevents the analyst from succumbing to the temptation
of simply postulating the required shift in preferences to \explain" all apparent contradictions to
his predictions". Becker [2], Chapter 1.
See also Stigler and Becker [34].
4 This game is ¯rst studied by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl [17], where it is part of a more complicated
market game.
5 For a survey of this evidence, see Fehr and GÄachter [16] and Charness and Haruvy [11].
6 This result is related to the ¯ndings in Bewley [4]: employers say they do not lower wages fearing the
impact of employers' bad mood on productivity. A comparison is di±cult because in our case the bad mood is
exogenous to the relationship between players; in the case Bewley describes, it may be caused by one of them.
See also Bosman andWinden [6] and Charness and Grosskopf [10] for attempts to analyze emotions and behavior
in games.
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ship, while the latter is measured by the intercept of this relationship. Generosity corresponds
to e®ort incurred even when no transfer is received, while reciprocity corresponds to higher
e®ort incurred to reward a larger transfer. Reciprocity and generosity di®er between subjects
in a good mood and in a bad mood. In particular, when second movers are in a bad mood,
reciprocity is higher, and generosity is lower. We ¯nd that moral behavior changes in response
to exogenously induced moods. In other words, your morals are your moods. This observa-
tion may be disturbing in itself. In addition, the assumption underlying the line of research
described above must be reconsidered. Moral preferences are not stable: they change with a
player's mood.
Psychology o®ers a di®erent setting to put the results we report into context. A large
literature studying mood and behavior ¯nds, with few exceptions, a positive correlation between
good moods and helping.7 The relationship we ¯nd between bad moods and reciprocity is not
inconsistent with these ¯ndings. Since helping behavior is distinct from reciprocal behavior,
we present a novel extension of the implications of mood on behavior. These results make clear
that altruism is not a well-de¯ned concept if it is taken in absolute terms, independently of a
person's mood.
Psychologists' views of the evidence that moods a®ect behavior are based on cognitive
interpretations of the role of moods and emotions. The idea of priming, for example, is used to
explain why helping behavior is more frequent in subjects in a good mood. An individual in a
good mood expects a more pleasant experience from social interaction, and is therefore more
willing to help. A second, related, idea is mood maintenance. Current happiness depends on
present actions and past happiness. Higher past happiness implies higher current happiness.
In this setting, individuals in a good mood try to maintain their mood, while individuals in a
bad mood try to change their mood. Under appropriate conditions, the optimal way to achieve
this target when in a good mood turns out to be helping behavior.8
Looking at these results, perhaps a di®erent foundation for moral behavior should be con-
7 For a review, see Carlson et al. [7], Morris [29], and Isen [27].
8 Substituting \utility" for \happiness", this is the point made in Hermalin and Isen [24].
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sidered: a foundation able to explain the role of moods, and the twin concept of emotions, in
behavior. For example, moods and emotions can be incorporated into a theory of behavior,
similar to the way altruism and reciprocity have been. In particular, an individual's utility func-
tion can depend on mood. In our view, this extension does not seem promising for two reasons.
First, it leads research into a vicious circle with theory trying to catch up with experimental
evidence.9 Second, it increasingly leads into causal, immediate, explanations of behavior: we
act in a certain way because we have preferences, or norms, or now moods that motivate these
actions. A di®erent type of explanation is a functional one, based on the advantage, in terms
of ¯tness (de¯ned by biological or cultural factors), of a behavior.
The explanations of reciprocity provided in many of the papers quoted earlier are causal,
not functional. These causal explanations (like the standard utility maximizing explanation in
di®erent settings) are not compatible with the environment's e®ect on behavior that we ¯nd
here.10 We ¯nd that the intensity of reciprocity is smaller when subjects are in good mood.
This result seems to require a new look at the cognitive theories explaining the connection
between altruism and moods, or emotions. This should be the subject of further experimental
and theoretical research
The reminder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design
in detail, including the mood induction procedure. Section 3 presents the empirical results and
measures the e®ect of mood on behavior. Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Each experimental session consisted of several rounds of a gift-exchange game. The rounds
were preceded by a mood-induction phase involving a subset of the subjects.
The game has two stages. In the ¯rst stage, player 1 receives a ¯xed monetary amount and
can transfer some of it to player 2. In the second stage, player 2 learns the transfer and then
9 A similar point is made by the citation in footnote 3.
10 A similar inconsistency is found in another paper, by two of us, which tries to assess the importance of
emotional factors in the performance of soccer teams, see Palomino et al. [31].
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decides an e®ort level. E®ort is costly to player 2 but bene¯cial to player 1.11 In particular,
for any given transfer higher e®ort reduces player 2's payo® but increases player 1's payo®.
Let t denote the transfer chosen by player 1 and e denote the e®ort chosen by player 2. t
can be any integer between 0 and 15, while e is a fraction between 0:1 and 1. Then, players
payo®s are given by the following:12
P1(t; e) = (15 ¡ t)e
for player 1, and
P2(t; e) = t ¡ c(e)
for player 2. The cost function c(e) is increasing, convex, and it ranges between 0 and 3:6; its
precise values are:
e 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1:0
c(e) 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:8 1:2 1:6 2:0 2:4 3:0 3:6
Subjects play this game for a ¯xed number of rounds. During all rounds, each subject
maintains the role of player 1 or player 2. The matching follows a round robin procedure, so
that a subject plays exactly once with each possible di®erent partner. Therefore, the number
of rounds depends on the number of subjects in a session. We had sessions with 16, 14, 12,
and 10 players, corresponding to 8, 7, 6, and 5 rounds respectively.
The only information players receive is the play of their counterpart in a round.13 The
matching is anonymous. Furthermore, players cannot observe the action of other pairs, or the
actions of their partner in previous rounds.
At the beginning of a session, the role of player 1 or 2 is assigned randomly and subjects
are then provided with the instructions. These are read aloud by an experimenter in front of
all participants. Then subjects answer a control questionnaire to check their understanding of
11 In the instructions, we use the term \conversion rate" to avoid negative perceptions. Here, we revert to the
more intuitive name \e®ort".
12 The unit of account is the Dutch Guilder; it was worth approximately half a US dollar when the experiment
took place.
13 This information is written on the `play sheet' by one of the two experimenters that are present.
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game and the way the payo®s are determined. The complete instructions and the questionnaire
are reported in the Appendix.
At this point, the mood induction phase begins. Subjects are told that players 2 will watch
a short sequence from a movie; therefore, players 1 leave the room to make this possible. This
phase has two di®erent treatments. The subjects watch a sequence from either Schindler's
List directed by Steven Spielberg, or from the movie City Lights directed and interpreted by
Charles Chaplin.14 The sequence from the ¯rst movie is the \liquidation of Krakow ghetto".
It shows the Nazi troops surrounding the ghetto, making prisoners or killing Jews. The second
sequence is the \boxing ¯ght". An hilarious episode with Charlie Chaplin dancing around the
ring to avoid to punches of his opponent. A more detailed description of the two sequences is
also in the Appendix.
At the end of the movie, subjects answer a brief questionnaire related to the movie and
their mood. Players 1 then come back into the room and the gift exchange game starts.15 After
the game is played, all subjects answer a second brief questionnaire also aimed at collecting
information about their mood. Both questionnaires are reported in the Appendix. At this
point all subjects are paid, privately and in cash, the amount won in each round they played.
2.1 Analysis of the game
The gift exchange game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE). In the second stage,
player 2 chooses the minimum e®ort. Anticipating this strategy, player 1 chooses the minimum
transfer. Hence, the only sub-game perfect equilibrium is an initial transfer t = 0, and an e®ort
e = 0:1 independent of the transfer of the other player.16 Players play the SPE only if they are
14 Before the projection they were only informed that they were going to watch a ¯ve minutes sequence from
a movie. They were not told which movie they were about to see.
15 Subjects acting as players 1 waited outside the room while the movie was shown. We made sure that no
communication took place during this time. They were not told which movie players 2 had seen.
16 This outcome yields the lowest sum of payo®s for the players. Since this sum is equal to
15e+ t(1¡ e)¡ c(e);
the pair that maximizes it is minimum e®ort and maximum transfer, that is e = 0:1 and t = 15.
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sel¯sh; that is, if they care only about their own earnings. However, abundant experimental
evidence shows that many subjects do not simply maximize their monetary payo®s: player 2
chooses e > 0:1 and there is a positive relationship between e and t. A variety of di®erent
theoretical approaches have been developed to capture these additional motives.
In models of altruism the consumption, or income, of another person enters as a good into
the utility function of the decision maker (see for example Andreoni [1]). Therefore, player 2
in a gift exchange game chooses an e®ort above the minimum level if his altruism is strong
enough. Furthermore, if 1's earnings are a normal good for 2, models of altruism predict a
positive relation between t and e (except for very high transfer levels).
In models of fairness the preferences of the agents depend on their own earnings as well
as on the fairness of the whole distribution. In Fehr et al. [18] and Fehr and Schmidt [19], a
player 2 who has received a large enough transfer chooses an e®ort above the minimum level.
The idea is that player 2 is willing to incur some cost to decrease the inequality of payo®s. The
e®ort is always chosen such that player 2's earnings are larger than player 1's earnings, since
player 2 is also motivated by self interest and does not aim at perfect equality. In Bolton and
Ockenfels [5], player 2 goes for perfectly fair outcomes whenever possible.17 For a given t, e
solves the equation:
(15 ¡ t)e = t ¡ c(e);
totally di®erentiating this expression one ¯nds a positive relation between transfers and e®ort.18
Finally, reciprocity theories are based on the idea that individuals want to return positive
and negative favors (see Rabin [32] and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [13]).19 Since in these
models individuals like to return kind and unkind actions with actions of the same type one
needs to evaluate an action's kindness. Individuals take intentions into account. Hence this
17 That is, in the range of transfers for which fair outcomes exist.
18 Charness and Rabin [12] also develop a fairness model. In their version, players take into account distribu-
tional concerns with a speci¯c focus on the individual with the smallest payo®.
19 Rabin [32] develops a theory of reciprocity in normal form games. This model provides di®erent predictions
for the gift exchange game since, as any normal form concept, it cannot take into account the game's sequential
structure. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger [13], on the other hand, develops a theory of reciprocity in extensive
form games.
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framework is very di®erent from fairness and altruism theories since in those models only the
¯nal distribution enters the analysis. Nonetheless, reciprocity considerations lead to similar
predictions in the gift exchange game. By making a large transfer, player 1 does player 2
a favor. Hence, the latter wants to reciprocate by choosing an e above the minimum level.
Furthermore, the larger the transfer, the larger the favor, and the more player 2 is willing
to spend to do player 1 a favor in return. Hence, reciprocity consideration also lead positive
relation between t and e.
Summarizing, experiments show that frequently players do not maximize their monetary
payo®s. Many theoretical models interpret this evidence assuming that players' behavior is
motivated by a desire for fairness, altruism, and reciprocity. In other words, these theories
suggest that individuals do not only care about narrow self-interest: moral norms shape their
behavior.
3 The evidence from the experiment
The experiment took place at the University of Tilburg, The Netherlands, in June 1999 and May
2000. The subjects were 130 undergraduate students (of which 46 were female), recruited with
an advertisement in the campus newspaper. We had 10 sessions, 5 per each mood induction
procedure, with a number of subjects per session varying between 10 and 16. Overall, the data
consist of 437 observations.
We begin with a very brief description of the aggregate results (this is an average over the
two treatments). These do not di®er substantially from those in the gift-exchange literature.
We next analyze the e®ect of the mood induction procedure. The result is that di®erent moods
induce di®erent behavior in the game. This di®erence is ¯rst assessed in non-parametric terms,
and then measured more precisely using regression analysis. Throughout, the focus of our
analysis is the behavior of the players who participated in the mood induction phase; that is,
we analyze the behavior of players 2. Players 1 behavior is in°uenced by the mood induction
stage only if players 2 behavior is.
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3.1 Aggregate data
The histogram in Figure 1 reports the number of times each pair transfer-e®ort was observed.
The pair (t = 0; e = 0:1), corresponding to the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
game, is the most frequent. It is observed in 42 cases, which represent less than 10% of
our observations.20 Players 2 did not always choose the minimum e®ort level and players 1
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Effort
Transfer
Observations per transfer-effort pairs
Figure 1: Distribution of choices
20 For a table reporting the entire data, see Section A.1 in the Appendix.
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Table 1 shows aggregate statistics for the experiment. The average transfer of player 1 was
5.2, while the average e®ort of player 2 was 0.3.21 The average payo®s for players 1 and 2 were
equal to 2.6 and 4.6 respectively. Players 2 do not always maximize their monetary payo®s.
They choose minimal e®ort in 185 (corresponding to 42 per cent) of our observations. In the
remaining cases, they sacri¯ce part of their achievable payo®s to the advantage of players 1.
The cost to transfer ratio, de¯ned as CT = c(e)t , is a possible measure of this phenomenon. In
the outcome of the game where the transfer is zero the ratio CT is not well de¯ned since player
1 's optimal transfer is zero. In the remaining observations, however, the cost-to-transfer ratio
averages 0.1, so players 2 sacri¯ce about 10 per cent of their potential earnings.
Table 1: summary statistics for transfer, e®ort, and cost to transfer ratio.
Transfer E®ort CT ratio Payo® 1 Payo® 2
Round All 1st All 1st All 1st All 1st All 1st
Average 5.206 5.385 0.300 0.305 0.108 0.112 2.611 2.729 4.604 4.815
Std. Dev. 3:08 2:36 0:23 0:20 0:16 0:16 1:86 1:62 2:82 2:16
Minimum 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0 0 0.6 -3.6 0
Maximum 15 12 1 0.8 1.2 0.8 15 7.2 14.6 10
The data we have just seen do not di®er substantially from the known results of gift exchange
experiments.22 Players do not play according to the SPE, and are better o® because of that.
Our data also display the typical `reciprocity' relationship between e®ort and transfer: The
e®ort chosen by the second mover increases with the transfer received. This can be seen in
Table 2 which presents, for each transfer received, the average and median e®ort choices of
players 2. From this table, one can also see how high transfers were extremely unlikely; players
1 chose transfers larger than 10 in less than 2 per cent of observations.
21 Actions taken in successive rounds may depend on previous play. So we report the statistics for the ¯rst
round of play separately. There seems to be no signi¯cant di®erence between these observations and the entire
data set.
22 For this evidence, see Fehr at al. [17] and [18], Charness [9], and Charness and Haruvy [11].
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Table 2: e®ort by transfer: average, standard deviation, and median.
Transfer
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
N 46 40 19 20 25 54 54 82 45 33
E®ort Mean 0.148 0.145 0.137 0.175 0.220 0.283 0.346 0.365 0.420 0.482
std:dev: 0:18 0:12 0:14 0:12 0:12 0:18 0:18 0:22 0:26 0:32
Median 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.35 0.4 0.5
10 11 12 13 14 15
N 11 1 3 2 1 1
E®ort Mean 0.436 0.300 0.800 0.250 0.100 0.300
std:dev: 0:30 0:17 0:21
Median 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.25 0.1 0.3
3.2 Mood induction
First, we show how the mood of subjects is a®ected by the movie; and how this change goes in
opposite directions in the two treatments. This step is necessary to establish that a di®erence
in behavior among the two treatments is a consequence of the subjects' mood, as manipulated
by the experimenters.
One measure of mood induction is obtained analyzing how subjects describe their own
mood. After seeing the movie, but before playing the game, second movers answered a brief
questionnaire. One question asked was \How do you feel?".23 Subjects could choose along
an 8-point scale ranging from \1: extremely happy, in a really good mood" to \8: extremely
unhappy, in a really bad mood". The average answer in the good mood treatment is 5.6 (with
a standard deviation 1.6), while it is 3.1 (standard deviation 1.3) in the bad mood treatment.
23 The entire questionnaire is found in Section A.2.
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How Do You Feel?
In a Really Good Mood





Figure 2: Questionnaire Answers by Second Movers
Figure 2 shows each individual's answer to the question \how do you feel?". Along the
horizontal axes are individuals: on the left side the ones in the good mood treatment, on
the right side the ones in the bad mood treatment. Along the vertical axes, higher points
correspond to worse self-reported mood post-movie questionnaire. Visually, the distribution of
answers in the right side of the graph appears higher than the distribution of answers in the left
side. This suggests the distribution of moods reported by subjects in the bad mood treatment
displays worse moods.
This visual impression is con¯rmed by a non-parametric test. Using the Mann-Whitney
procedure, we can test the null hypothesis that self-reported moods are drawn from the same
distribution in the two treatments. The Mann-Whitney statistic equals 5.403, and it implies
a p-value smaller than 0.0001. Therefore, at least in a relative sense, subjects who saw the
sequence from Schindler's List felt in a negative mood while subjects who saw the sequence
12
for City Lights felt in a positive mood.
As time goes by and, perhaps more importantly, as the subjects take part into the experience
of playing the game, the e®ect of mood induction fades away. When testing the same null
hypothesis, equality of the distributions of answers to the same \how do you feel?" question
with answers subjects gave after the game was played, we ¯nd a Mann-Whitney statistic equal
to 0.296 which implies a p-value of 0.7675.
Finally, we can compute the di®erence between how subjects feel right after the movie and
how they feel right after the game. This variable measures how their mood changed during the
game: it is negative if they feel worse and positive if they felt better. The average for good
mood subjects is -0.8, while it is 1.9 for bad mood subjects. The Mann-Whitney statistic, equal
to 4.535 for a p-value less than 0.0000, con¯rms this di®erence. Using the Wilcoxon signed-rank
test for matched-pairs, we can directly test if subjects answer the question di®erently before
and after playing the game. The statistic equals 4.379 for bad mood subjects (p-value smaller
than 0.0001) and -1.453 (p-value of 0.1461) for positive mood subjects. To conclude: there is
very strong evidence that bad mood subjects felt better after the game. There is also evidence,
although weaker, that good mood subjects feel worse.
3.3 Mood and behavior: summary statistics and nonparametric tests.
Having veri¯ed subjects do indeed feel, or at least say they feel, di®erently as a consequence
of the mood induction procedure, we now study their choices. The starting point are the same
summary statistics presented for the overall game. As before, and for the same reason, we also
report statistics for the ¯rst round of play. The overall values presented in Table 3 appear
similar, with transfer and e®ort both slightly larger in the bad mood treatment.
The di®erence between the two moods becomes clearer once we look at e®ort choices by
transfer in Table 4. At low transfers, e®ort is higher when players are in a good mood; at
relatively large transfers, e®ort is higher when players are in a bad mood. Very large transfers,
larger than 10, are extremely unlikely and happen only in the good mood treatment. These ¯rst
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Table 3: summary statistics by mood.
Transfer E®ort CT ratio
Round All 1st All 1st All 1st
Good Mood Mean 5.068 5.382 0.283 0.282 0.110 0.116
std:dev: 3:32 2:55 0:24 0:22 0:19 0:20
Bad Mood Mean 5.372 5.387 0.322 0.329 0.105 0.108
std:dev: 2:76 2:17 0:22 0:18 0:10 0:08
Payo® 1 Payo® 2 N
Round All 1st All 1st All 1st
Good Mood Mean 2.498 2.503 4.508 4.865 238 34
std:dev: 2:08 1:84 3:12 2:36
Bad Mood Mean 2.747 2.977 4.720 4.761 199 31
std:dev: 1:54 1:31 2:43 1:96
rough statistics seem to hint at a substantial di®erence in behavior between the two moods. At
this point, however, we do not know whether the di®erence is signi¯cant. More re¯ned tests are
necessary, beginning with non-parametric tests of equality of distributions, and are presented
next.
Unless otherwise noted, all the nonparametric tests use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statis-
tic which is approximately normally distributed. Table 5 reports zs and p-values for these test.
They correspond to two-samples tests which all have the same null hypothesis H0: the distri-
bution that generates data in the good mood treatment is the same distribution function that
generates the data in the bad mood treatment.
In the ¯rst period of play the behavior of the players 1 is not signi¯cantly di®erent across
moods. This is reasonable, since they were not subject to the mood conditioning procedure.
14
Table 4: e®ort by transfer and mood: mean, standard deviation, and median.
Transfer
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
N 31 22 12 11 13 33 28 33 22 17
Good Mean 0.168 0.177 0.15 0.145 0.238 0.279 0.314 0.300 0.364 0.494
Mood std:dev: 0:22 0:15 0:17 0:07 0:13 0:20 0:20 0:26 0:29 0:26
Median 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5
N 15 18 7 9 12 21 26 49 23 16
Bad Mean 0.107 0.106 0.114 0.211 0.2 0.29 0.381 0.408 0.474 0.469
Mood std:dev: 0:03 0:02 0:04 0:16 0:11 0:13 0:16 0:19 0:22 0:36
Median 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.45
10 11 12 13 14 15
N 8 1 3 2 1 1
Good Mean 0.475 0.300 0.800 0.250 0.100 0.300
Mood std:dev: 0:33 0:17 0:21
Median 0.35 0.3 0.7 0.25 0.1 0.3





Table 5: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney non parametric tests; H0 is equal distributions between good
and bad mood data.
E®ort Cost to transfer ratio Transfer
All rounds First round All rounds First round All rounds First round
z 2.576 1.681 2.317 1.897 1.387 0.354
p-value 0.0100 0.0927 0.0205 0.0578 0.1654 0.7232
Payo® 1 Payo® 2
All rounds First round All rounds First round
z 2.921 1.920 .893 -0.112
p-value 0.0035 0.0548 0.3717 0.9110
The behavior of players 2, however, is signi¯cantly di®erent across moods. The test yields
a p-value around 0.09 for e®ort and 0.06 for cost to transfer ratio. The latter is particularly
important since it incorporates player 2s reactions to the transfer received. These e®ect become
even more signi¯cant when we consider the whole sample. The hypothesis that the observed
sample of e®orts comes from the same distribution under good and bad mood can be rejected
strongly; the same conclusion applies to cost-to-transfer ratios. Interestingly, the behavior
of players 1 appears weakly a®ected by players 2 mood (p-value 0.16). This e®ect is not
unexpected. If one considers roles instead of individuals the game is played repeatedly. Then,
second movers can in°uence the choices of ¯rst movers. Therefore, if the mood of the second
movers in°uences their choices, it also in°uences the choices of ¯rst movers.
We noted earlier that Table 4 displays a positive relationship between e®ort and transfer
which appears to be di®erent across the two moods. In the Appendix, we present a very
ambitious non-parametric test about the distribution of chosen e®orts for each transfer level.
The tests are not always very powerful since some transfer levels are not chosen very often.
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Still, one observes that when the transfer equals 1, 6, 7, or 8 there is a signi¯cant di®erence
in behavior across moods.24 When the transfer is 1, the e®ort chosen by individuals in a good
mood is higher; when the transfer is 6, 7, or 8, the e®ort chosen by individuals in a bad mood
is higher.
Table 6: average payo®s by transfer and mood.
Transfer
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Good Payo® 1 2.52 2.43 1.95 1.74 2.62 2.79 2.83 2.40 2.54 2.96 2.37
Mood Payo® 2 -0.24 0.78 1.83 2.91 3.68 4.50 5.40 6.37 7.14 7.73 8.75
Bad Payo® 1 1.60 1.48 1.49 2.53 2.20 2.90 3.43 3.26 3.32 2.81 1.67
Mood Payo® 2 -0.01 0.99 1.97 2.71 3.78 4.51 5.21 6.10 6.85 7.70 9.33
The importance of these di®erences across moods becomes even more evident when looking
at players' payo®s by transfer and mood, as presented in Table 6. Transfers equal to 6, 7 or
8 are chosen in 50% of all negative mood observations and 35% and of all good observations;
furthermore, a transfer equal to 7 constitutes the mode in both treatments. In these cases, the
e®ort chosen by player 2 has a signi¯cant and sizeable impact on payo®s. Consider a player 1
who has chosen a transfer equal to 7. If she faces a good mood opponent, her average payo®
equals 2.4; if she faces a bad mood opponent, her average payo®s equals 3.26. This constitutes
an increase in payo® of 36%. Di®erences of similar magnitude are obtained for transfers equal
to 6 or 8 (21% and 31% respectively). Therefore, a di®erence in moods implies not only a
statistically signi¯cant di®erence in e®ort, but also a large di®erence in opponents' payo®.
Another test on the di®erence between good and bad mood choices can be carried through
using the standard deviation of e®ort choices for each transfer level. This series is displayed
24 See Table A-2 in Section A.1.
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in Table 4, and seems to suggest a higher standard deviation of e®ort for individuals in a
good mood. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test yields a z value of -1.651 (p-value 0.0987) and
con¯rms the visual impression that these series are indeed di®erent.25
3.4 Regression analysis
In this section we measure more explicitly how the behavior of player 2 depends on his mood.
This dependence can take place in two di®erent ways. First, the behavior of the player 2 may
di®er in the two di®erent moods regardless of what players 1 does. Second, player 2 may react
to the choices of players 1 di®erently depending on mood. The analysis below shows these
e®ects are both strong and signi¯cant.
The ¯rst step is to build a regression model to estimate these e®ects appropriately. Let eir
be the e®ort chosen by the ith subject in the role of player 2 after seeing transfer tir of the
player 1, who was the partner of i in round r. We estimate the following model:
eir = ® + ¯Xir + ºi + "ir; (3.1)
where Xir is a vector of independent variables, ºi represents unobserved characteristics of
individual i, and "ir is an error term with the usual properties. One can estimate equation
(3.1) under two di®erent sets of assumptions. If we assume the variables º's are random, with
mean zero, uncorrelated with X and ", then we have the random-e®ects model. If we assume
the º 's are constant parameters, we have the ¯xed-e®ects model. The choice between these
models may depend on the actual right hand side variables employed.
Our regressors are the following. Transfer, a variable equal to the transfer tir player 2i
receives before choosing e®ort eir; Good Mood, a dummy variable equal to one if i was in the
good mood treatment and zero otherwise; Good Mood multiplied by tir ; Female, a dummy
variable equal to one if i is female and zero otherwise; Female multiplied by tir; Transfer · 2
25 This result is in line with some studies in psychology; they have suggested that di®erent moods may in°uence
the volatility of players' choices (see Hertel and Fiedler [25] and Hertel et al. [26]). In particular, individuals in
a good mood display more erratic behavior.
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and Transfer = i, with i = 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15, dummy variables equal to one when tir has
the appropriate value and zero otherwise. The non parametric tests of the previous section
point to di®erences in behavior across moods which should be re°ected in the coe±cients
of the variables Good Mood and Good Mood £ Transfer. Players' gender is the only observed
individual characteristic we can include in the estimation.26 The transfer variables are included
to account for possible non linearities in the data at low and high transfer levels.27
Modelling ºi carefully is important for two reasons: ¯rst, individuals may have di®erent
preferences, and they may behave di®erently in the game; second, individuals may react in
di®erent ways to the mood induction procedure. Introducing individual e®ects we measure
systematic properties of behavior, which may be induced by moods. The two estimation pro-
cedures are, in this respect, very di®erent. The random e®ect estimator is appropriate only
when there is no correlation between X and "; otherwise the ¯xed e®ect model is necessary.
The ¯xed e®ect estimator, however, cannot estimate some of the regressors in which we are
interested.












ei = ® + ¯Xi + ºi + "i (3.2)
and
e = ® + ¯X + º + ": (3.3)
If we subtract equation 3.2 from equation (3.1) and then add equation 3.3 we get
eir ¡ ei + e = ® + ¯
³
Xir ¡ Xi + X
´
+ º + "ir ¡ "i + ": (3.4)
26 There are 25 female Player 2, 11 in the good mood treatment and 14 in the bad mood. These numbers
correspond to 32% and 45% of the respective populations. Therefore the distribution of genders was slightly
di®erent across moods.
27 The `small transfer' dummy tries to measure if Players 2 chose the lowest e®ort unless they receive a big
enough transfer. The `high transfer' dummies are included because large transfer are very infrequent, particularly
in the bad mood treatment.
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Estimation of equation (3.4) is equivalent to estimation of equation (3.1). The advantage is
that the ºis have dropped out and one need not worry about unobserved individual e®ects.
This ¯xed e®ect estimator, however, cannot estimate variables in X that do not change with
the round index r, Good Mood and Female in our case, since they are perfectly collinear with
the constant in equation (3.4). It can only estimate their interactions with Transfer.
Summarizing, there is a trade-o® between a more precise evaluation of the e®ect of the mood
induction procedure and the risk of assuming incorrectly that ºi, the X and " are uncorrelated.
If they were, on the other hand, the ¯xed e®ect estimator would still provide the right answer
since it does not depend on the individual e®ects. Table 7 below reports the results for both
procedures. They do not appear systematically di®erent, which makes us favor the random
e®ect speci¯cation since it includes all the regressors of interest.28 The comments below, then,
pertain to the random e®ects model unless speci¯ed. We also used di®erent speci¯cations,
including ordered probit and tobit, to account for particular features of our data. They all
yield results very similar to the ones described below, and are available upon request.
The constant is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. If one believes behavior to be linear,
this result indicates Players 2 would choose an unfeasible e®ort level after receiving a zero
transfer (the lowest feasible e®ort is 0.1).29 Transfer is highly signi¯cant and has a positive
sign. Players 2 behavior is reciprocal : if the transfer received increases by one they will increase
their e®ort by roughly 0.06. In this respect, our data do not di®er from previous studies of
the gift exchange game. Good Mood is positive and signi¯cant. Players 2 unconditionally
choose higher levels of e®ort when in a good mood. Good Mood £ Transfer is negative and
signi¯cant. When in a good mood, players 2 respond 40 per cent less to the transfer they
receive if compared to players in a bad mood. While Female is not signi¯cant, its interaction
with Transfer is signi¯cant and negative. It indicates women react less than men to transfers.
28 The Hausman speci¯cation test for random e®ects, is equal to 2.71 which for a Â2(10) distribution implies
a p-value equal to 0.9874. It con¯rms that the di®erence between random and ¯xed e®ects estimates is not
systematic.
29 Some caution is appropriate. Even though the lack of signi¯cance of Transfer · 2 does not point in this
direction, a zero constant may stem from some non linearity in behavior at low transfer levels.
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Table 7: Regressions with pooled data; N=437, I=65.
Random E®ects Fixed E®ects
R2 Â2 p ¡ value R2 F p ¡ value
0.269 255.27 0.000 0.239 24.33 0.000
Coe±cient t p-value Coe±cient t p-value
Constant 0.0144 0.292 0.770 0.0687 2.13 0.034
0:0493 0:0322
Transfer 0.0588 9.939 0.000
0:0059 0.0596 9.91 0.000
Good Mood 0.0837 1.760 0.078 0:006
0:0483 ¢ ¢ ¢
Good Mood £ Transfer -0.0219 -4.157 0.000 -0.0231 -4.28 0.000
0:0053 0:0054
Female 0.0159 0.330 0.741 ¢ ¢ ¢
0:0483
Female £ Transfer -0.0108 -2.048 0.041 -0.0117 -2.161 0.031
0:0053 0:0054
Transfer · 2 0.0408 1.264 0.206 0.0395 1.203 0.23
0:0323 0:0328
Transfer=10 -0.0635 -1.304 0.192 -0.0657 -1.331 0.184
0:0487 0:0494
Transfer=11 -0.0845 -0.563 0.573 -0.0678 -0.446 0.656
0:1501 0:152
Transfer=12 0.2228 2.42 0.016 0.2178 2.330 0.02
0:0921 0:0935
Transfer=13 -0.1412 -1.224 0.221 -0.1239 -1.06 0.29
0:1153 0:1168
Transfer=14 -0.489 -3.124 0.002 -0.4816 -3.026 0.003
0:1565 0:1591
Transfer=15 -0.421 -2.620 0.009 -0.4337 -2.638 0.009
0:1607 0:1644
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3.5 Summary of the empirical analysis: moods and morals
The ¯nding of the previous sections highlight signi¯cant di®erences in behavior following our
mood induction experiment. Players in a good mood behave di®erently from players in a bad
mood along two moral dimensions: altruism and reciprocity. Altruism is measured by the
intercept of the regression presented in Table 7, reciprocity is measure by its slope. They both
change when players' mood is changed.
Individuals in a good mood are more altruistic. They give without necessarily having
received. This evidence of generosity is in line with a long-standing literature in psychology.
There is a respectable body of evidence establishing a positive relationship between good mood
and helping behavior (extensive surveys of these results are in Carlson et al. [7] and Isen [27]).
Individuals in a bad mood are more reciprocal. They give more as a function of what they
received. This result is novel, and maybe counterintuitive. Based on the previous evidence of
a positive relationship between good mood and generosity, many psychologists have posited a
positive relationship between good mood and cooperative behavior. On the other hand, others
have found a positive relationship between negative a®ect and cooperation (see Hertel and
Fiedler [25], and Hertel et al. [26]). In summary, there is very scant evidence either way, and
our experiment provides new insight into this topic.
Another interesting piece of evidence relates sel¯sh behavior and mood. One can say player
2 is sel¯sh if and only if she always maximizes her payo®. This is a particularly strict de¯nition,
since it implies player 2 chooses the lowest possible e®ort level regardless of the transfer received.
In our experiment, 9 players turn out to be sel¯sh according to this criterion, corresponding to
approximately 14 per cent of the population. What is interesting is the division of these players
among the two moods: 7 sel¯sh players are in the good mood treatment (21 per cent of the
population), while only 2 sel¯sh players are in the bad mood one (6 per cent of the population).
This di®erence is striking, and a nonparametric test of the hypothesis that the distribution of
sel¯sh individuals is the same in the good mood and bad mood populations can weakly reject
the null; the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney statistic is -1.635 with corresponding p-value equal to
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0.102.
We conclude that moral dimensions of behavior can be signi¯cantly in°uenced by emotional
aspects which are completely exogenous to the decision task at end.30
4 Conclusions
We reported the results of an experiment testing the e®ect of mood on the behavior of players
in a gift-exchange game. In this game, the ¯rst mover owns some amount of money and can
transfer some of it; the second mover can reciprocate by choosing a costly e®ort that increases
the payo® of the ¯rst player. We add to the design a mood induction stage. This focuses on the
subjects playing as second movers. The mood induction has two di®erent treatments: one that
induces a positive mood, and the other that induces a negative mood. The mood manipulation
appears e®ective on the basis of answers of the subjects to direct questions about their mood.
Previous work shows that the behavior of players in experiment is di®erent from the one
predicted by the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game played among sel¯sh agents. This
equilibrium has zero transfer and zero e®ort. We con¯rm this result for both moods induced.
Transfers and e®ort are typically positive.
However, the degree of reciprocity changes with the mood. This is measured by how
sensitive the second mover's e®ort is to the ¯rst mover's transfer. Subjects in a positive mood
exhibit reduced sensitivity: they o®ered on average a higher e®ort, but with a lower dependence
of the transfer of the ¯rst player. On the contrary, people in negative mood were making the
e®ort provided depend steeply of the transfer of the ¯rst player.
These results show that the extended preferences, de¯ned not only over own payo®s but
also over other players' payo®s, are not stable to changes in mood. This suggests the need for
30 One interesting and puzzling aspect of our experiment is that although moods and behavior were di®erent,
the players' perception of performance (their own and their opponents') is una®ected. In other words, since
players' behavior was signi¯cantly di®erent in the two treatments one might expect a signi¯cant di®erence in
the perception players have of their own and their partner's behavior. After the game, we asked both groups
of players to rate their own performance and the performance of their partner only to discover no signi¯cant
relationship.
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a more general theory, based on the combination of the cognitive role of mood and emotions
and evolutionary selection.
A Appendix
A.1 Data and Complete Regression Results
Table A-1. Number of occurrences of e®ort and transfer pairs by induced mood.
Transfer
E®ort 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 Total
Good Mood
0 28 2 1 31
1 17 3 2 22
2 11 1 12
3 7 3 1 11
4 4 3 4 1 1 13
5 12 5 6 6 1 2 1 33
6 8 4 5 4 5 2 28
7 15 6 4 3 4 1 33
8 7 6 3 1 2 1 2 22
9 3 2 3 2 5 2 17
10 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 8
11 1 1
12 2 1 3
13 1 1 2
14 1 1
15 1 1
Total 115 28 22 23 14 5 18 3 6 4 238
Bad Mood
0 14 1 15
1 17 1 18
2 6 1 7
3 4 3 1 1 9
4 6 1 4 1 12
5 4 5 2 9 1 21
6 3 2 4 9 6 1 1 26
7 7 3 10 6 8 12 3 49
8 2 2 3 4 3 2 5 2 23
9 6 1 1 1 1 1 5 16










































Comparison between good and bad mood
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Table A-2. Tests of e®ort choices by transfer; H0 is equal distributions between moods.
Transfer
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
z -0.41 -1.60 0.32 0.97 -0.74 0.98 1.60 2.44 1.62 -0.22 -0.41
p-value 0.684 0.110 0.751 0.331 0.456 0.328 0.108 0.015 0.106 0.826 0.681
N good mood 31 22 12 11 13 33 28 33 22 17 8
N bad mood 15 18 7 9 12 21 26 49 23 16 3
Table A-3. Regressions with pooled data; N=437, I=65, min Ni=5, max Ni=8.
Random E®ects Fixed E®ects
R2: within 0.402 0.402
R2: between 0.136 0.107
R2: overall 0.269 0.239
Wald test = 255.27 p-value 0.000 F test = 24.33 p-value 0.000
Coe±cient t p-value Coe±cient t p-value
Constant 0.0144 0.292 0.770 0.0687 2.13 0.034
0:0493 0:0322
Transfer 0.0588 9.939 0.000 0.0596 9.91 0.000
0:0059 0:006
Good Mood 0.0837 1.76 0.078
0:0483
Good Mood £ Transfer -0.0219 -4.157 0.000 -0.0231 -4.28 0.000
0:0053 0:0054
Female 0.0159 0.33 0.741
0:0483
Female £ Transfer -0.0108 -2.048 0.041 -0.0117 -2.161 0.031
0:0053 0:0054
Transfer · 2 0.0408 1.264 0.206 0.0395 1.203 0.23
0:0323 0:0328
Transfer=10 -0.0635 -1.304 0.192 -0.0657 -1.331 0.184
0:0487 0:0494
Transfer=11 -0.0845 -0.563 0.573 -0.0678 -0.446 0.656
0:1501 0:152
Transfer=12 0.2228 2.42 0.016 0.2178 2.33 0.02
0:0921 0:0935
Transfer=13 -0.1412 -1.224 0.221 -0.1239 -1.06 0.29
0:1153 0:1168
Transfer=14 -0.489 -3.124 0.002 -0.4816 -3.026 0.003
0:1565 0:1591
Transfer=15 -0.421 -2.620 0.009 -0.4337 -2.638 0.009
0:1607 0:1644
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Table A-4. Regressions using good mood data; N=238, I=34, min Ni=5, and max Ni=8.
Good Mood
Random E®ects Fixed E®ects
R2: within 0.282 0.283
R2: between 0.149 0.121
R2: overall 0.198 0.186
Wald test = 80.85 p-value 0.000 F test = 8.55 p-value 0.000
Coe±cient t p-value Coe±cient t p-value
Constant 0.1015 1.749 0.080 0.1198 2.517 0.013
0:058 0:0476
Transfer 0.0358 4.714 0.000 0.0351 4.639 0.000
0:0076 0:0076
Female 0.0208 0.304 0.761
0:0477
Female £ Transfer -0.0095 -1.235 0.217 -0.0118 -1.511 0.132
0:0077 0:0636
Transfer·2 0.0354 0.741 0.459 0.0282 0.588 0.557
0:0477 0:0479
Transfer=10 -0.0524 -0.822 0.411 -0.0625 -0.982 0.327
0:0637 0:0636
Transfer=11 -0.0803 -0.485 0.628 -0.063 -0.381 0.703
0:1656 0:1652
Transfer=12 0.2283 2.207 0.027 0.2254 2.178 0.031
0:1034 0:1035
Transfer=13 -0.1446 -1.089 0.276 -0.1141 -0.86 0.391
0:1329 0:1327
Transfer=14 -0.4796 -2.753 0.006 -0.4736 -2.713 0.007
0:1742 0:1745
Transfer=15 -0.406 -2.253 0.024 -0.4217 -2.317 0.022
0:1802 0:182
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Table A-5. Regressions using bad mood data; N=199, I=31, min Ni=5, and max Ni=8.
Bad Mood
Random E®ects Fixed E®ects
R2: within 0.533 0.533
R2: between 0.124 0.122
R2: overall 0.37 0.368
Wald test = 190.15 p-value 0.000 46.88 p-value 0.000
Coe±cient t p-value Coe±cient t p-value
Constant 0.0103 0.188 0.851 0.0081 0.19 0.85
0:0545 0:0429
Transfer 0.0603 8.561 0 0.0612 8.623 0.000
0:007 0.0071
Female 0.0112 0.184 0.854
0:0439
Female £ Transfer -0.0119 -1.644 0.100 -0.0115 -1.576 0.117
0:0072 0.0835
Transfer·2 0.0479 1.092 0.275 0.0532 1.204 0.23
0:0439 0.0442










You are about to participate in an economic experiment that is part of a research project
about decision-making. The instructions are simple, and if you read them carefully and make
appropriate decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money. All earnings resulting
from your decisions in the experiment will be added up and paid privately to you in cash at the
end of the experiment. The instructions are for private use only. Communication between the
participants is strictly forbidden. If you have a question, please raise your hand. Attached to the
instructions you will ¯nd a questionnaire that you should complete after we have gone through
the instructions (and all remaining questions are answered). Together with these instructions
you also have got a "documentation" that will be used to document your decisions.
The experiment consists of 8 rounds. At the beginning of each round pairs consisting of
two persons each are formed. These two persons are called Person A and Person B. Each of
you acts in all 8 rounds either as Person A or as Person B. Whether you are A or B is noted
on the card you have drawn. After a round is ¯nished, new pairs with di®erent persons are
formed, and the next round begins. You will never be matched twice with the same person,
and you will not learn the identity of them.
In each round, Person A is endowed with 15 points. At the beginning of a round, A has
to decide how many points she/he wants to transfer to the Person B she/he is matched with.
This transfer t can be any integer between 0 and 15. Hence, transfers like 12 or 3 are allowed,
but not transfers like 5.4 or 9.6. The points not transferred to B (i.e. 15 ¡ t) remain with A.
When A has made a decision about the transfer, she/he has to record this transfer on her/his
documentation in the line "transfer". It will then be transmitted to "her/his" Person B by the
experimenter by recording it in B's documentation in the line "transfer".
After B is informed about the transfer, she/he has to decide about a conversion rate r. r
can be 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, .1. (see the list of feasible values of r on page 2 of these instructions).
When B has made a decision about the conversion rate, she/he has to record it in her/his
documentation in the line "conversion rate". It will then be transmitted to Person A by the
experimenter by recording it in A's documentation in the line "conversion rate". This ¯nishes
the round, and the next round with new partners start. Note, though, that your role (A or B)
remains ¯xed.
The conversion rate r chosen by B is the rate that exchanges the points remaining with A
into Dutch Guilders. Hence, A's earnings in a round in Dutch Guilders are given by:
earnings of A = (15 ¡ transfer t)( conversion rate r)
B earns the points transferred to her/him. But the of the conversion rate is connected with
costs c(r), which depend the conversion rate B chooses. As you can see from the list of possible
conversion rates r and conversion rate costs c(r), these costs are increasing in r. Hence, B's
earnings in a round in Dutch Guilders are given by:
earnings of B = transfer t ¡ conversion rate cost c(r)
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Do you have any questions?
Conversion rate costs:
e 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1:0
c(e) 0:0 0:2 0:4 0:8 1:2 1:6 2:0 2:4 3:0 3:6
Questionnaire
We would like to test whether you have understood our instructions. Therefore we ask you to
answer the following questions. Please try to answer each question. Wrong answers have no
consequences for you.




(Three more questions like the previous one followed at this point.)
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The Movies
In the bad mood treatment, the following sequence of approximately 6 minutes from Universal
Pictures' Schindler's List, directed by Steven Spielberg, is shown .
Liquidation of the Ghetto, March 13, 1943. The scene begins with trucks
full of soldiers ready to move into the Ghett. Then the Nazi stormtroopers, many
of whom have leashes on muzzled dogs, set up for the extermination. Noises of
the growling dogs, trucks, and orders shouted out are heard. The stormtroopers
surround the buildings and expel the Jews from their apartments. Fear appears on
the faces of the children. In one of many vignettes, some of the refugees roll their
valuable jewels into wads of bread to be swallowed. Any resistance or questioning
is halted with a gun. Suitcases are dumped from upper balconies and abandoned
as litter. A young male character tells her ¯ance that he is planning to escape
through the sewer tunnel, but she refuses to join him. He opens a manhole cover
and descends into the steamy depths. Frightened Jews are yelled at and herded
into groups. One father is killed with machine-gun ¯re for de°ecting a soldier's
aim toward his son's back as he was attempting to run away. The boy is also
arbitrarily shot as he is dragged back. To prevent even crueler deaths, a doctor
in the hospital calmly measures out doses of poison that are soon administered
by nurses to patients. The lifeless corpses are machine-gunned until the soldiers
realize they're already dead. Without regard to family considerations, women are
segregated from the men, splitting husbands and wives.
In the good mood treatment, the following sequence of approximately 6 minutes is shown from
Charles Chaplin Productions' City Lights, directed by Charles Chaplin.
Boxing Fight. The boxing ¯ght sequence is a funny choreographed ballet
between the Tramp (Chaplin) his opponent (a mean looking boxer) and their referee
(a tall wide man). The Tramp defensively dances around in the ring to avoid the
punches of the big opponent, deftly hiding and ducking for safety behind the tall
referee, and slipping away from his opponent at one point to leave his opponent
facing the referee. Later in the ¯ght, the bell rope gets wrapped around the Tramp's
neck. When he is knocked down, the rope pulls on the bell and luckily, the round
is declared over. But unfortunately, when he turns to go to his corner for a rest,
the Tramp's movement rings the bell again, starting the next round.
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Questionnaires
Questions before the game was played.
Answer by circling the appropriate number.
1. Rate the artistic content of the scene you just saw on the following scale:







8: extremely low / very bad
2. Rate the actors' performance in the scene you just saw on the following scale:
1: extremely good / very able
...
8: extremely bad / very unable
3. Rate how do you feel on the following scale:
1: extremely happy / in a very good mood
...
8: extremely unhappy / in a very bad mood
4. Rate a price of 5d° to watch the entire movie on the following scale:
1: extremely cheap / a very good bargain
...
8: extremely expensive / a very bad bargain
Questions after the game was played.
Answer by circling the appropriate number.
1. Rate your performance in the economic experiment on the following scale:
1: extremely satisfactory / very good
...
8: extremely unsatisfactory / very bad
2. Rate how do you feel now on the following scale:
1: extremely happy / in a very good mood
...
8: extremely unhappy / in a very bad mood
3. Rate how happy you feel about your partners' decisions in the experiment on the following
scale:
1: very happy / extremely satis¯ed
...
8: very unhappy / extremely unsatis¯ed
4. Have you ever participated in an economic experiment before:
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